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Abstract
We consider nonparametric identification of independent private value first-
price auction models, in which the analyst only observes winning bids. Our
benchmark model assumes an exogenous number of bidders N . We show that,
if the bidders observe N , the resulting discontinuities in the winning bid density
can be used to identify the distribution of N . The private value distribution can
be identified in a second step. A second class of models considers endogenously-
determined N , due to a reserve price or an entry cost. If bidders observe N ,
these models are also identifiable using winning bid discontinuities. If bidders
cannot observe N , however, identification is not possible unless the analyst
observes an instrument which affects the reserve price or entry cost. Lastly,
we derive some testable restrictions for whether bidders observe the number of
competitors and whether endogenous participation is due to a reserve price or
entry cost. An application to USFS timber auction data illustrates the useful-
ness of our theoretical results for competition analysis, showing that nearly one
bid out of three can be non competitive. It also suggests that the risk aversion
bias caused by a mismeasured competition can be large.
Keywords: Auction models, unobserved competition, nonparametric identifi-
cation, density discontinuities, endogeneous participation, unobserved hetero-
geneity, discrete mixture models
JEL classification: C14, C57, D44
1 Introduction
There exists a large literature on nonparametric identification of auction models;
see, e.g., Athey and Haile (2007) or Hendricks and Porter (2007) for a review. In
the case of sealed-bid first price auction, a vast majority of work assumes that the
analyst can observe all of the bids, or both the winning bid and the number of
competitors. This may not always be observed. Lamy (2012) mentions that, in
French timber auctions, only the winning bid may be available to researchers to
preserve anonymity of the bidders. It is common practice in many markets that can
be treated as auctions for only the winning bid (i.e. the transaction price) to be
recorded. For instance, a company soliciting price quotes for a task to be completed
is implicitly organizing a first-price auction. While the company may not record all
quotes or the number of responses, the price charged to the winning bidder is likely
to appear in accounting records. As noted in Han and Strange (2015), “bidding wars”
are becoming commonplace in housing markets, where houses are sold through a
competitive bidding process resembling an informal first-price auction. Governments
may offer subsidies to attract firms as recently considered by Kim (2018) and Slattery
(2019) using an auction framework. Observing all the subsidy offers is again unlikely.
Hence, in many economic situations of interest, the records only contain the final
winning bid. Therefore, the ability to identify auction primitives solely from winning
bid data may enlarge the scope of auction theory applications.
A second motivation stems from misspecification considerations, because the ob-
served number of bids can be a misleading indicator of competition. For instance,
Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) consider an application where bidders are agents
acting for several buyers such that the number of bids underestimates competition.
Alternatively, some buyers may enter an auction simply to gain information, in which
case their bids will be dominated and never impact the winning bid; counting these
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bids would overestimate competition. When the observed number of bids as a mea-
sure of competition is at doubt, using only winning bids provides a robust approach
for identifying primitives of interests. Our USFS timber application illustrates the
bias in estimating risk-aversion when we use the number of bids as the measure of
competition as in Lu and Perrigne (2008) or Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong
(2011). Bidders are much more likely to be risk neutral when we are agnostic about
the distribution of competition.
Last, the distribution of competition is a parameter of interest in itself. We view it
as a latent variable and recover it from the winning bid. As noted above, the number
of observed bids is often different from the number of bids actually contributing to
the winning bid. In this case, the more meaningful measure is the latter, which is
useful for auction design such as choosing an optimal reserve price. In our USFS
timber application, it is found that nearly one bidder out of three does not bid in a
competitive way. As noted by Bulow and Klemperer (1996), increasing competitive
participation would give a higher seller expected revenue than choosing an optimal
reserve price. Our finding therefore suggests that, among other things, the seller
should consider a bidder training program, as studied in De Silva, Li and Zhao (2019),
or should investigate whether the dominated bid is due to collusion, see eg Abrantes-
Metz and Bajari (2009).
This paper therefore studies the identification of model primitives using only data
on winning bids. Specifically, we develop a new approach for first-price auction model
identification that exploits discontinuities in the density function of the winning bid.
First, we identify the distribution of unknown competition. In particular, we build on
an important restriction that first-price auction models impose on the data: the bid
quantile function must be strictly increasing with respect to the number of bidders.
Therefore, the upper boundary of the bid distribution, conditioning on the number
of bidders, is strictly increasing, as well. We show that this creates discontinuities, or
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jumps, in the winning bid density function at these upper boundaries. A novel result
of the paper is that these jumps identify the distribution of the number of bidders.
Second, we identify the value distribution function by iteratively exploiting two
equilibrium mappings relating the value and bid quantile functions. Based on the
location of winning bid density discontinuities, we create a sequence of expanding
quantile intervals over which the private value quantile is identified. For every itera-
tion, we start by identifying the bid quantile function in the most competitive auction,
which has the largest number of bidders. This information can then be used to iden-
tify the value quantile function in the same quantile interval and further calculate the
corresponding bid quantile for other competition levels.
We then extend our results to endogenous participation due to the presence of a
reserve price or entry cost. When active buyers observe the number of participants,
identification extends naturally. On the other hand, identification fails due to a lack of
discontinuity if active buyers cannot observe the number of participants. We restore
identification assuming that the analyst can instrument for the reserve price or entry
cost, as in Gentry and Li (2014). In addition, it is assumed that the analyst observes
auctions where the object is not sold or there is only one participant. Identification is
then established exploiting the simple binomial distribution of the number of bidders.
Lastly, we derive testable restrictions of whether or not bidders observe the number
of competitors, and if participation is constrained by a reserve price or entry cost.
In models of endogenous participation, it is usually assumed that the buyers do not
observe the number of active buyers. See, among others, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong
(2000), Marmer, Shneyerov and Xu (2013) or Gentry and Li (2014). As known since
McAfee and McMillan (1987), the expected payoff of a first-price auction with reserve
price or entry cost does not depend upon buyers information regarding competition.
Hence, under risk neutrality of buyers and sellers, both kinds of buyer competition
information are likely to hold. Whether buyers observe competition can be a known
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market characteristic, as in the case where active buyers sit in the same room or
in housing market “bidding wars” where real estate agents often decide to reveal
the number of offers. But it can also be a parameter of interest, as in the case of a
company contacting contractors in a public or private way unobserved by the analyst.
Related literature
Auctions with unobserved competition. Allowing for unknown competition
started early in the empirical auction literature. Laffont et al. (1995) estimate the
number of buyers N as a parameter that they take to be constant across auctions.
Paarsch (1997) treats unknown competition as a nuisance parameter, which is elim-
inated using conditional likelihood estimation. For ascending eBay auctions, Song
(2004) shows that the private value distribution and a constant number of buyers
are identified from winning and second highest bids, but not from winning bids alone
when N is random. More pertinent to our paper is the misclassification approach of
An, Hu and Shum (2010), who achieve identification from the winning bid using a
proxy N∗ ≤ N for the number of buyers and an instrument that can be a discretized
second bid. Shneyerov and Wong (2011) suppose that only winning bids and the
number of active bidders are observed. Recent work for ascending auctions include
Quint (2015) and Freyberger and Larsen (2017).
Mixture distribution. The present paper contributes to the literature on non-
parametric identification of finite mixtures; see for instance the review of Compiani
and Kitamura (2016). Existing identification results require either exclusion restric-
tions or multiple independent measurements. A first-price auction example of the
latter is d’Haultfœuille and Février (2015), who recover the distribution of an un-
observed continuous auction characteristic from three bids. Hu and Sasaki (2017)
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obtain identification from two measurements in a model with discrete unobserved
heterogeneity. In our setting, the number of buyers can be viewed as unobserved het-
erogeneity while the winning bid is a unique bid. Identification is however possible
because the mixture components are the bid distribution given N = n, issued from
the same private value distribution and constrained by an optimal bidding condition.
When the buyers do not observe the number of competitors, this is restrictive enough
to ensure identification in presence of a reserve price or entry cost instrument, without
the exclusion restrictions of Compiani and Kitamura (2016).
Discontinuity design. The discontinuity design (DD) literature has expanded
rapidly in recent years; interested readers are encouraged to refer to review papers by
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Kleven (2016) and Jales and Yu (2017). Recent auction
applications include Coviello and Marinello (2014), and Choi, Neisheim and Razul
(2016). As in the DD literature, this paper employs jump sizes for identification
purposes - more specifically, to identify the probability that N = n. However, this
paper departs from the DD literature by considering an unknown number of density
discontinuities with unknown location, which identify the support of N .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the benchmark model. In Section 3, we extend our analysis to auction models with
endogenous competition generated by reserve price or entry cost, for when buyers
can or cannot observe competition. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical
application. Section 5 concludes. We also include a proof section that contains all
proofs omitted in the main text. A discontinuity detection algorithm, which also
compute a discontinuous density estimator, is presented in the appendix.
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2 The benchmark model
In this section, we start by describing the benchmark auction model and introduce two
equilibrium mappings that are convenient for describing our discontinuity identifica-
tion strategy. Next, we derive the restrictions that the model imposes on the observed
winning bids, especially with respect to the formation of discontinuities. Finally, we
describe our identification strategy in two steps. First, we identify the distribution
of the number of buyers from the discontinuities in the winning bid density func-
tion. Second, we identify the value distribution function using the two equilibrium
mappings iteratively.
2.1 The symmetric independent private values paradigm
Suppose there is a single item for sale with N active symmetric buyers bidding for the
item. All buyers observe N . In contrast, the analyst does not observe N , which causes
auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Each buyer i also observes her private
valuation Vi, which is unknown to other buyers. The private values Vi are i.i.d. draws
from a distribution F (·), which is known to all the buyers and is independent of N .
The buyers are risk neutral and their bids Bi are formed according to a symmetric
best-response strategy. In sum, the primitives are the distribution of the number of
buyers N and the private value distribution.
We assume that the analyst only observes the winning bid W , i.e., the maximum
bid among the N buyers in the set N of active buyers
W = max
i∈N
Bi.
Hence, the analyst observes draws from the unconditional cumulative probability
distribution of the winning bid G(·), which is a mixture of the conditional winning
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bid distributions given N :
G(b) =
+∞∑
n=2
P
(
max
1≤i≤n
Bi ≤ b
)
× P (N = n) =
+∞∑
n=2
Gnn (b)P (N = n) , (1)
where Gn(·) is the conditional bid distribution given N = n.
The two next assumptions introduce some additional conditions for the distribu-
tion of N and for the private value distribution F (·).
Assumption N. The number of active buyers N is a discrete random variable
with support {n, . . . , n} for some integers 2 ≤ n ≤ n, i.e., pn = P (N = n) > 0 for
n = n, n+ 1, . . . , n with
∑n
n=n pn = 1.
Assumption IPV. Buyers’ private values Vi are unknown to competitors and
i.i.d. draws from a common knowledge distribution F (·). The cumulative distribution
function F (·) has a compact support [v, v]. Its probability density function f (·) is
continuous and strictly positive over [v, v].
Both theoretical and empirical literatures adopt the assumption of a private value
distribution with compact support. In particular, it rules out multiple asymmetric
equilibria; see Maskin and Riley (1984, Remark 2.3), who also establish that symmet-
ric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bids are given by a strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable function of private values.
For our discontinuity approach, the compact support assumption ensures the ex-
istence of discontinuities in the density of unconditional winning bids that we exploit
in this paper. In particular, the winning bid densities gn(·) given N = n stay bounded
away from 0 at its upper boundary; see (7) below.
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2.2 Bid and value quantile equilibrium mappings
In this subsection, we describe two equilibrium mappings that are repeatedly used
in our identification procedure. Specifically, there is an equilibrium mapping from
the value distribution and the bid distribution, and vice versa. Our discontinuity
identification strategy is conveniently described using the quantile framework as in
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2009), Liu and Luo (2016), and Guerre and Gimenes
(2019), that we recount below.
Let V (α) = F−1 (α) represent the private value quantile function, where α ∈ [0, 1]
is the quantile level. Let Bn (α) denote the bid quantile function given that n buyers
participate in the auction. Following Milgrom (2001)’s exposition of the identification
strategy of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), the private value quantile function
V (·) can be viewed as the common valuation function of buyers who receive indepen-
dent uniform private signals
Ai = F (Vi) ,
which determine their private values Vi = V (Ai). By Assumption IPV, Bi = βn (Ai)
for all i, where βn (·) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable. It follows
that for any b in the range of βn (·),
Gn (b) = P (βn (Ai) ≤ b) = P
(
Ai ≤ β−1n (b)
)
= β−1n (b)
because Ai is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Hence the best-response strategy is
the bid quantile function
βn (α) = Bn (α) for all α ∈ [0, 1] .
Now, let us relate the bid and private value quantile functions. Suppose that buyer
i receives signal α but makes a suboptimal bid Bn (a) for some a ∈ [0, 1]. Since her
opponents bid Bn (Aj), the probability that her bid Bn (a) wins the auction is given
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by P(maxj 6=iAj ≤ a), which is equal to an−1 as the signals of the n − 1 opponents
Aj, where j 6= i, are independent and uniform. It follows that the expected payoff of
buyer i is (V (α)−Bn (a)) an−1, which is maximized when a = α. Since
∂
∂a
[
(V (α)−Bn (a)) an−1
]∣∣∣∣
a=α
= V (α) (n− 1)αn−2 − ∂ [Bn (α)α
n−1]
∂α
= (n− 1)αn−2
(
V (α)−Bn (α)− αB
(1)
n (α)
n− 1
)
,
setting this derivative to 0 gives
V (α) = Bn (α) +
αB
(1)
n (α)
n− 1 . (2)
This constitutes the equilibrium mapping from the bid quantile function to the value
quantile function, which is the basis of the identification of V (·) with knowledge of
Bn(·).
Now, let us consider the inverse of the mapping (2). Indeed, (2) is equivalent to
∂[Bn(α)αn−1]
∂α
= V (α) (n− 1)αn−2 and, it follows,
Bn (α) =
n− 1
αn−1
∫ α
0
tn−2V (t)dt. (3)
For convenient of identification that will be clarified later on, let us introduce the
conditional bid upper bound
bn = Bn(1) = (n− 1)
∫ 1
0
tn−2V (t)dt,
which gives
Bn(α) =
n− 1
αn−1
[
bn
n− 1 −
∫ 1
α
tn−2V (t) dt
]
. (4)
This constitutes the equilibrium mapping from the value quantile to the bid quantile
function. The two mappings represented in (2) and (4) are repeatedly used in our
identification procedure.
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2.3 Structure of the winning bid distribution
The structure of winning bid distributions compatible with a first-price auction where
buyers observe N follows from the mixture expression of G(·) in Equation (1) and
the best-response differential equation (2).
Proposition 2.1 A c.d.f. G (·) is rationalized by a first-price auction model satisfy-
ing Assumptions N, IPV, and observability of N by buyers if and only if
(i). The c.d.f. G (·) has a mixture structure
G (·) =
n∑
n=n
pnG
n
n (·) , (5)
where the Gn(·) are c.d.f., 2 ≤ n ≤ n and the positive pn satisfy
∑n
n=n pn = 1.
(ii). The quantile functions Bn (·) = G−1n (·) are continuously differentiable over [0, 1]
and satisfy the compatibility conditions
Bn (α) +
αB
(1)
n (α)
n− 1 = Bm (α) +
αB
(1)
m (α)
m− 1
for all n ≤ n,m ≤ n and all α ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover the function V (α) = Bn (α) +
αB
(1)
n (α)
n−1 is continuously differentiable over [0, 1] with V
(1)(·) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: It remains to be shown that (i) and (ii) are sufficient. The
function V (·) in (ii) is a quantile function associated with a c.d.f. F (·) satisfying the
requirements of Assumption IPV while the mixture weights pn define a distribution
for N as in Assumption N. These {pn, n ≤ n ≤ n} and private value quantile function
V (·) generate a distribution for N and best response bidding strategy functions Bn(·)
by (3), with G(·) as a winning bid c.d.f. 
In short, a c.d.f. G(·) as in Proposition 2.1 is a mixture with components con-
strained by compatibility conditions driven by the best response differential equation
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(2). The compatibility conditions of Proposition 2.1-(ii) reflects that the mixture
components Gn(·) are generated by the same private value distribution, an important
feature for identification. In particular, our identification results rely on the con-
straints it imposes on the extremities of the conditional bid p.d.f. gn(·), as illustrated
in the next corollary. Recall bn = Bn(1), v = V (0) = bn and v = V (1).
Corollary 2.1 Suppose that the compatibility conditions of Proposition 2.1-(ii) hold.
Then for all n = n, . . . , n, bn < v, and
gn (v) =
n
n− 1f (v) , with (6)
gn
(
bn
)
=
1
(n− 1)(v − bn)
. (7)
Proof of Corollary 2.1: The compatibility conditions imply that (3) holds, and
integrating by parts gives
Bn (α) =
1
αn−1
∫ α
0
V (t) d
[
tn−1
]
= V (α)−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
V (1) (t) dt.
Hence bn = v −
∫ α
0
tn−1V (1) (t) dt < v as V (1) (·) > 0. Note that this also gives
Bn(α) < V (α) for all α > 0, and then B(1)(α) > 0 by (2). When α goes to 0, the
following holds
Bn(α) = V (0) + V
(1)(0)α + o(α)−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1 (
V (1) (0) + o(1)
)
dt
= V (0) +
n− 1
n
V (1)(0)α + o(α),
which shows that B(1)n (0) = n−1n V
(1)(0). As B(1)n (·) > 0, the conditional bid p.d.f.
gn(·) satisfies
gn (b) =
1
B
(1)
n (Gn (b))
for all b ∈ [v, bn, ] . (8)
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Hence gn(v) = 1/B
(1)
n (0) = nn−11/V
(1)(0) = n
n−1f(v), which is (6). For (7), (2) and
(8) give
gn
(
bn
)
=
Gn
(
bn
)
(n− 1) (V (Gn (bn))− bn) = 1(n− 1) (v − bn)
as Gn
(
bn
)
= 1, so that (7) holds. 
Equation (7) implies that gn
(
bn
)
is strictly positive. It turns out from (1) that
this causes discontinuities in the winning bid p.d.f. g(·) at each bn, as studied in
the next section. As it follows that bn is identified, (7) shows that gn
(
bn
)
, where
n ∈ {n, . . . , n}, are determined by the common unknown parameter v. We employ
this consequence of the compatibility conditions of Proposition 2.1-(ii) later on to
identify the distribution of N .
2.4 Winning bid density discontinuities
In this subsection, we introduce a numerical example to illustrate the discontinuity
features of the winning bid p.d.f that follows from Corollary 2.1. This example will
also be useful for introducing our identification procedure. A general lemma completes
the example.
2.4.1 Numerical example
Consider the private value c.d.f. F (v) = v2 for all v in [0, 1] and a number of buyers
N = {2, 3} with equal probability. As V (α) = α1/2, it follows that
Bn(α) =
n− 1
αn−1
∫ α
0
tn−2+
1
2dt =
n− 1
n− 1
2
α1/2.
Hence bn = n−1n− 1
2
and (8) yields the conditional bid p.d.f gn(b), given N = n, is equal to
2b/b
2
n on [0, bn] and vanishes outside this interval. Figure 1 displays the conditional
c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the winning bid when N = {2, 3}. Note that the support of
12
bGn(b)
1
v b2 b3
(a) c.d.f. Gnn(·)
b
nGn−1n (b)gn(b)
v b2 b3
2G2(b2)g2(b2)
3G23(b3)g3(b3)
(b) p.d.f. nGn−1n (·)gn(·)
Figure 1: Conditional winning bid distribution, where N = {2, 3} and V (α) = √α
the conditional density function increases with the number of buyers. Both densities
jump to zero at their upper boundaries as expected from (7).
Let us now turn to the winning bid, the observation of the analyst. As expected
from Figure 1b, the unconditional p.d.f. g(b) = 1
2
· 2G2(b)g2(b) + 12 · 3G23(b)g3(b)
displayed in Figure 2b is discontinuous at b2 and b3, with jump sizes ∆2 and ∆3
respectively. The resulting winning bid c.d.f. exhibits kinks at these values, as il-
lustrated by Figure 2a. In this example, Figure 2b exhibits two discontinuities (and
Figure 2a exhibits two kinks) because N takes two potential values here.
2.4.2 The general case
The increasing support property observed in Figure 1 and the winning bid p.d.f
discontinuities in Figure 2b are generic, as shown in the upcoming lemma. Lemma
2.1-(i) recalls more generally that bids increase with competition — a key feature of
13
bG(b)
1
v b2
1
2
(1 +G33(b2))
b3
(a) c.d.f. G(·)
b
g(b)
v b2 b3
∆2
∆3
(b) p.d.f. g(·)
Figure 2: Winning bid distribution (V (α) =
√
α and P(N = 2) = P(N = 3) = 1/2)
first-price auctions that does not hold in ascending or second-price ones.1 Lemma
2.1-(ii) focuses on the winning bid p.d.f. discontinuities and its jumps.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose Assumptions N and IPV hold. Then, all of the following hold.
(i). For all α in (0, 1], Bn (α) < · · · < Bn (α) < V (α) with Bn (0) = V (0) for all n.
In particular, for bn = Bn(1), bn < · · · < bn < v.
(ii). The c.d.f. G (·) has a p.d.f. g (·) with g(v) = 0, which is continuous over the
straight line with the exception of the n−n+1 discontinuity points bn < · · · < bn,
the interval
[
v, bn
]
being the support of G (·). For n ≤ n ≤ n, the jumps
1This feature also does not hold when buyers do not not observe N , in which case the model
primitives are not identified. For the sake of brevity, we do not establish here that observation of
competition by buyers is essential for purposes of identification. This can be done as in Proposition
3.2-(ii), which considers a reserve price model wherein active buyers cannot observe competition.
Haile, Hong and Shum (2003) have also used support variation to test a common value setting
against a private value one.
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∆n = limt↓0
(
g(bn − t)− g(bn + t)
)
satisfy
∆n =
npn
(n− 1)(v − bn)
. (9)
(iii). It holds that n = limt↓0 logG(v+t)log t .
Proof of Lemma 2.1: As
Bn (α) =
1
αn−1
∫ α
0
V (t) d
[
tn−1
]
= V (α)−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
V (1) (t) dt
differentiating with respect to n gives
∂Bn (α)
∂n
= −
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
log
(
t
α
)
V (1) (t) dt ≥ 0,
the inequality is strict except when α = 0, in which case Bn (0) = v for all n. It
follows that the bid c.d.f. Gn(·) given that N = n has a support [v, bn], with an upper
bound bn = Bn(1) which is strictly increasing with respect to n and strictly smaller
than v = limn↑∞ bn. Hence, this proves Part (i). For part (ii) The expression for
jumps (9) follows from (5), which shows that the winning bid p.d.f. is
g (b) =
n∑
k=n
pkkG
k−1
k (b) gk (b) , (10)
with gk(b) = 0 for b > bn when k ≤ n by Lemma 2.1-(i). This gives
g(bn − t)− g(bn + t)
=
n∑
k=n
pkkG
k−1
k
(
bn − t
)
gk
(
bn − t
)− n∑
k=n+1
pkkG
k−1
k
(
bn + t
)
gk
(
bn + t
)
→ npngn
(
bn
)
= ∆n
when t goes to 0. The equality (7) for gn
(
bn
)
then gives (9). For part (iii), continuity
of B(1)n (·), which is bounded away from 0 and infinity, and (8) shows that gn(·) is
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continuous with gn(v) > 0 by (6). This gives when t goes to 0
G (v + t) =
n∑
n=n
pn
(∫ v+t
v
gn(u)du
)n
=
n∑
n=n
png
n
n(v)t
n (1 + o(1))
= png
n
n(v)t
n (1 + o(1))
as pngnn(v) > 0, which implies n = limt↓0
logG(v+t)
log t
. 
Lemma 2.1 is an important building block for identifying the competition distri-
bution. Part (iii) is a tail identification result for n as in Hill and Shneyerov (2013).
Lemma 2.1-(ii) shows that the jumps in the winning bid p.d.f. identify P(N = n) up
to the unknown v.
2.5 Identification
Here, we first illustrate our identification procedure using the numerical example of
Section 2.4.1. We then turn to the identification of competition and the private value
distribution.
2.5.1 Numerical example (cont’d)
By Lemma 2.1-(iii), n = 2 is identified. The winning bid c.d.f. of Figure 2a has two
kinks, which identify the upper bounds b2 < b3, and then n = 3. Consider now the
jumps ∆2 and ∆3 of the winning bid p.d.f. in Figure 2b. Expression (9) for the jumps
allows for the identification of p1 = p2 = 12 ; see Lemma 2.2.
Let us now turn to the identification of the private value distribution, which is
based on the winning bid c.d.f.
G(b) =
1
2
(
G22(b) +G
3
3(b)
)
displayed in Figure 2a. Since G22(b) = 1 on [b2, b3],
G3(b) = (2G(b)− 1)
1
3 , b ∈ [b2, b3].
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αBn(α)
V (α)
n = 2
n = 3b3
0 1
b2
α1 = G3(b2)
β1
α2
β2
α3
β3
α4
β4
Figure 3: Iterative identification of Bn(α) and V (α) from G(·), as in Figure 2.
It follows that B3(·) is identified on [α1, 1], where α1 = G3(b2), using the top portion
of the winning bid distribution; see Figure 2a when G(b) ∈ [1
2
(1 + G33(b2)), 1]. Using
the mapping (2) from the bid quantile function to the private value one gives
V (α) = B3(α) + αB
(1)
3 (α),
and V (·) is identified on [α1, 1]. Additionally, using the mapping (4) from the private
value quantile function gives
B2(α) =
1
α
[
b2 −
∫ 1
α
V (t)dt
]
so that B2(·) is also identified on [α1, 1]. The identified B2(α), B3(α), and V (α),
where α ∈ [α1, 1], are displayed in blue in Figure 3.
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Next, we enlarge the interval [α1, 1] over which V (·) is identified. For this purpose,
let β1 = B2(α1) < b2 and observe that G2(b) is identified for b ≥ β1. Since
G3(b) =
(
G22(b)− 2G(b)
) 1
3 ,
G3(b) is identified for b ≥ β1, as B3(α) is identified for α ≥ α2 = G3(β1). Figure 3
shows that α2 < α1 and arguing as above gives us identification of V (·) and B2(·) on
[α2, 1]. Three portions of V (·), B3(·), and B2(·) are identified through three iterations
and plotted in purple, red and orange, respectively, in Figure 3. Furthermore, Figure
3 suggests that additional iterations of this identification procedure should allow us
to recover any V (α).
2.5.2 Identification of the distribution of N
In this subsection, we describe the identification of the support of N and its distribu-
tion using the discontinuity points and jump sizes. To identify the support, we exploit
two implications of Lemma 2.1: (1) the minimum number of buyers n is identified
from the winning bid distribution tail near the lower boundary; (2) each number of
buyers n generates a discontinuity in the winning bid distribution, which identifies
the difference n − n. More specifically, Lemma 2.1-(ii) identifies n and n through
n = limt↓0
logG(v+t)
log t
and
n = n+ Card {b; g (·) is discontinuous at b} − 1.
This also identifies the support of the distribution of N as P(N = n) > 0 for all n
with n ≤ n ≤ n by Assumption N.
Next, we exploit the jumps in the p.d.f. to identify pn = P(N = n). Recall that
Equation (9) identifies pn up to the private value upper bound v,
pn =
n− 1
n
∆n
(
v − bn
)
.
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But
∑n
n pn = 1 implies
v =
1 +
∑n
n=n
n−1
n
∆nbn∑n=n
n
n−1
n
∆n
. (11)
Hence pn satisfies
pn =
n−1
n
∆n∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆k
+
n− 1
n
∆n
(∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆kbk∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆k
− bn
)
, n = n, . . . , n, (12)
and is identified because the discontinuity points bk and jump sizes ∆k are. We
summarize these identification results in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose Assumptions N and IPV hold. Then v, n, n, bn < · · · < bn, v
and the probabilities pn, n = n, . . . , n, are identified.
The identifying equations (11) and (12) can also be used to derive inequality
constraints satisfied by the jumps sizes ∆n, discontinuity locations bn, the lowest and
largest numbers of bidders n and n. Indeed v > bn and 0 ≤ pn ≤ 1 are equivalent to
the equations2
n∑
k=n
k − 1
k
∆k
(
bn − bk
) ≤ 1,
1 +
n∑
k=n
k − 1
k
∆k
(
bk − bn
) ≤ ∑nk=n k−1k ∆kn−1
n
∆n
, n = n, . . . , n
given that it must also holds that ∆n > 0 by Lemma 2.1-(ii). A violation of any of
these inequalities indicate that the model is not correct.
2.5.3 Identification of the private value quantile function
We now obtain identification of the value quantile function by iteratively exploiting
the two equilibrium mappings in (2) and (4). We proceed in three steps:
2It is easily seen that bn < v, which is equivalent to the first inequality, implies 0 ≤ pn, n =
n, . . . , n. The second inequalities are equivalent to pn ≤ 1, n = n, . . . , n.
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Step 1. Note that the winning bid distribution satisfies
G (b) = 1− pn + pnGnn (b) for all b in
[
bn−1, bn
]
so that Gn (·) is identified over
[
bn−1, bn
]
as follows
Gn (b) =
(
G (b)− (1− pn)
pn
)1/n
for b in
[
bn−1, bn
]
.
Set
α1 = Gn
(
bn−1
)
.
It follows that Bn (·) is identified on [α1, 1], i.e.,
Bn (α) = W
[
(1− pn) + pnαn
]
,
where W (·) = G−1 (·) is the winning bid quantile function.
Using the mapping from the bid quantile function to the value quantile function
(2) shows that the private value quantile function satisfies, for all α ∈ [α1, 1],
V (α) = Bn (α) +
1
n− 1αB
(1)
n (α)
= W
[
(1− pn) + pnαn
]
+
npn
n− 1α
nW (1)
[
(1− pn) + pnαn
]
,
and V (·) is identified over [α1, 1].
Using the mapping from the value quantile function to the bid quantile function
(4) shows that the bid quantile functions Bn (·), n = n, . . . , n − 1 are also identified
over [α1, 1]. Hence {Bn(α), α ∈ [α1, 1]} and
{
Gn(b), b ∈ [Bn(α1), bn]
}
are identified,
for all n = n, . . . , n.
Step 2. We now expand the interval over which Gn(·) is identified using an
iterative argument. Define
β1 = Bn−1 (α1) ,
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which is identified from the last step. Note that β1 < bn−1 whenever α1 > 0 because,
by Lemma 2.1-(i),
β1 = Bn−1
[
Gn
(
bn−1
)]
< Bn
[
Gn
(
bn−1
)]
= bn−1.
The definition of G(·) implies that
Gn (b) =
(
G (b)−∑n−1n=n pnGnn (b)
pn
)1/n
, (13)
where G (·) and pn are identified, and Gn(·) are identified on [Bn(α1), bn] for all
n = n, . . . , n − 1. Since Bn(α1) < . . . < Bn−1(α1) = β1, [β1, bn] ⊆ [Bn(α1), bn] for all
n. Therefore, the conditional bid distribution Gn (b) is identified on [β1, bn].
Step 3. We now identify V (·) on a growing interval [αk, 1] using an induction
argument and the identified V (·) on [α1, 1]. For an integer k ≥ 2, define
αk = Gn (βk−1) = Gn [Bn−1 (αk−1)] , βk = Bn−1 (αk) .
Identification of V (·) on the growing interval [αk, 1] is established in Lemma 2.3 below.
Lemma 2.3 Suppose Assumptions N and IPV hold. Then
(i). the sequences {αk, k ≥ 1} and {βk, k ≥ 1} are decreasing sequences with
lim
k→∞
αk = 0.
(ii). {αk, k ≥ 1} is identified. For any integer number k ≥ 2, {V (α) , α ∈ [αk, 1]} is
identified if {V (α) , α ∈ [αk−1, 1]} is identified.
Proof of Lemma 2.3: See Section 6.1 in the proof section.
Combining Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 shows that the joint distribution of private values
and the number of active buyers is identified.
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Theorem 2.1 Suppose Assumptions N and IPV hold and that the buyers observe the
number of active buyers N . Then F (·) and the distribution of N are identified.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Lemma 2.2 shows that the distribution of N is identified.
Since N is independent of private values, it remains to be shown that the private
value quantile function V (·) is identified. Take α > 0. By Lemma 2.3-(i), there exists
k such that α > αk and Lemma 2.3-(ii) yields identification of V (α). Since V (0) = v
is identified by Lemma 2.2, the Theorem is proven. 
3 Endogenous competition
So far, we have assumed exogenous participation, i.e., the number of buyers being
independent of private values. In many cases of interest, participation arises endoge-
nously, such as when the seller imposes a reserve price below which bids will not
be considered, or when buyers face entry costs. This section extends our results to
endogenous competition due to a reserve price or entry cost.
In these cases, the breadth of possible outcomes is richer than in our benchmark
model. In particular, the auctioned object may not be sold when buyers decide not
to enter the auction, as accounted in the next Definition of the outcome distribution.
Definition 3.1 A distribution G (·) is an outcome distribution if and only if it
assigns probabilities solely to the events in the σ-field generated by
{the object is not sold} , {the object is sold at a price less than b} , b ∈ R.
In the sequel, these two events will be abbreviated as {Not Sold} = {N = 0}, also
refereed a failed auction later on, and {W ≤ b}, respectively, where W stands for the
winning bid or, more generally, the transaction price. The winning bid distribution of
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the benchmark model, which attributes zero probability to {Not Sold} is an example
of a continuous auction outcome distribution.
Additionally, Definition 3.1 allows for the following two kinds of discrete compo-
nents. First, the object may remain unsold with positive probability. Second, G (·)
can have discrete components even when the object is sold. For instance, if a unique
buyer enters an auction with a reserve price R and observes an absence of competitors,
she can win the auction by bidding R, such that P(W = R) > 0 if P(N = 1) > 0. In
this reserve price example, as in many others, the (renormalized) continuous compo-
nent of G (·), denoted as G (·), is the distribution of the winning bid given that there
is at least two participants.
That the model allows for these additional outcomes raises the issue of econometric
selection. Consider, for instance, winning bids data derived from firms’ accounting
books. A failed auction with an unsold object will be absent from the records as
no transaction took place. Furthermore, a seller may be tempted to cancel auctions
that are attended by a sole buyer who wins simply by bidding the reserve price. In
this case, identification of the model should be based not on G but on a conditional
outcome distribution given that the events above do not happen. In the reserve price
and entry cost examples considered below, the latter conditional outcome distribution
coincides with the continuous component G(·) of G(·).
3.1 First-price auction with reserve price
In this subsection, we consider endogenous competition due to the presence of a
reserve price. Assume that the seller will not sell the item if the maximum bid
is lower than a reserve price R, which is known to the buyers. Only buyers with
Vi ≥ R, or equivalently Ai ≥ F (R) can win, and are called participants or active
buyers. We assume that the analyst only observes the winning bid maxi∈N Bi when
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the auctioned good is sold, does not know the reserve price R, the number n ≥ 2 of
potential buyers3 or the number NR of participants (except when failed auction with
NR = 0 are observed).
The number of participantsNR has a binomial distribution with parameter (n, 1− F (R));
that is
P (NR = n) =
n!
n!(n− n)! [1− F (R)]
n F n−n(R).
Because the buyers participating in the auction receive a signal Ai ≥ F (R), it is
convenient to renormalize the signal as
Ai,R =
Ai − F (R)
1− F (R) (14)
assuming v ≤ R < v from now on. Given NR = n ≥ 1, the auction participants’
signals Ai,R are i.i.d. draws from the [0, 1] uniform distribution. Let FR(·) and VR(·)
be the conditional c.d.f. and quantile function of the private values Vi given Vi ≥ R,
such that
FR(v) =

0 if v < R
F (v)−F (R)
1−F (R) if R ≤ v ≤ v
1 if v > v
,
VR(α) = V [F (R) + (1− F (R))α] .
As discussed for the benchmark model, the winning bid p.d.f is discontinuous
when the participants observe NR before submitting bids, a property that plays an
important role for identification. We therefore consider separately the cases where
participation is known or unknown to active buyers.
3There is no need to identify the minimal number of participants n among the parameters as the
lower bound of NR is known to be 0.
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3.1.1 Participation known to active buyers
First, let us recall the expression of the best-response bidding strategy when the
participants observe NR = n. If n = 0, the auctioned object is not sold. If n = 1, it
is optimal for the unique participant to bid the reserve price R. If n ≥ 2, the optimal
bidding strategy is a strictly increasing function of Ai,R under Assumption IPV, which
is equal to the bid quantile equation Bn,R(·) = B (·|N = n,R), given NR = n ≥ 2.
Arguing as in (2), except using Ai,R and VR(·) in place of Ai and V (·), yields the best
response differential equation
Bn,R (α) +
α
n− 1B
(1)
n,R (α) = VR(α). (15)
It follows that
Bn,R (α) =
n− 1
αn−1
∫ α
0
tn−2VR(t)dt = VR(α)−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
V
(1)
R (t)dt. (16)
Structure of the outcome distribution. We describe the constraints on the
distribution of observables imposed by the reserve price. The continuous component
G(·) of the outcome distribution is the conditional winning bid distribution given
W > R,4 such that
G(b) = G (W ≤ b |W > R) . (17)
Proposition 3.1 An outcome distribution G (·) is rationalized by a first-price auction
model satisfying Assumptions IPV where buyers observe the number of participants
and with a reserve price R in (v, v) if and only if
(i). There is a probability q ∈ (0, 1), an integer number n ≥ 2 with G (Not sold) =
qn, and a unique R > 0 such that G (W = R) > 0 and is equal to nqn−1 (1− q) .
4Equivalently, NR ≥ 2. Using the event {W ≥ R} instead is more convenient for identification
purposes, as W is observed by the analyst and R is identified as the lower bound of the support of
G(·).
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(ii). Let G(·) be as in (17). There exists some c.d.f. Gn(·) such that
G(·) =
n∑
n=2
pnG
n
n(·), pn =
n!
n! (n− n)!
qn−n (1− q)n
1− qn − nqn−1 (1− q) .
(iii). The quantile functions Bn (·) = G−1n (·) satisfy the compatibility conditions of
Proposition 2.1-(ii) with Bn(0) = R.
Proof of Proposition 3.1: See Section 6.2 in the proof section.
Proposition 3.1 is very similar to Proposition 2.1 of the benchmark model, up to
the mixture weights pn which are now given by a binomial distribution.
Identification results. The compatibility condition of Proposition 3.1-(iii) induces
discontinuities in the p.d.f. of G(·). This gives the next identification corollary, which
mostly follows from Theorem 2.1. Corollary 3.1-(ii) shows that the model primitives
are identified from well functioning auctions with more than two participants provided
the number of potential buyers is greater than or equal to three.
Corollary 3.1 Consider a first-price auction satisfying Assumption IPV with a re-
serve price R in (v, v) and NR participants, where NR is known to the buyers but not
to the analyst. Then
(i). the reserve price R, number of potential buyers n and conditional private value
distribution FR (·) are identified from the c.d.f. G (·) defined in (17).
(ii). if n ≥ 3, the private value c.d.f. {F (v) , v ≥ R} is identified from the c.d.f.
G (·).
(iii). if n = 2, the c.d.f {F (v) , v ≥ R} is identified from the outcome distribution
G (·) but not from G(·).
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Proof of Corollary 3.1: See Section 6.3 in the proof section.
Corollary 3.1-(i) follows from Theorem 2.1 as FR (·) is the updated distribution
of the private value given participation. Identification of F (R) from G (·) requires
at least three potential buyers. This discrepancy between n = 2 and n ≥ 3 can be
understood using Lemma 2.2, which shows here that, for n ≥ 3, the probabilities
pn(R) = P (NR = n |NR ≥ 2) =
n!
n!(n−n)!F
n−n(R) [1− F (R)]n
1− F n(R)− nF n−1(R) [1− F (R)] , n = 2, . . . , n
are identified through the discontinuities of the p.d.f. g(·) of G(·). This is sufficient
to identify F (R) and then to identify F (v) for v ≥ R.
This contrasts with n = 2, in which case g(·) is continuous over its inner support.
The c.d.f. G(·) is helpful for recovering FR(·) but not informative enough regarding
the screening level F (R) due to the lack of density discontinuities. As Corollary 3.1-(i)
shows that n is identified, F (R) can be recovered from G (Not sold), and observing
failed auctions is necessary to identify {F (v), v ≥ R}.5
More generally, the proof of Corollary 3.1-(ii,iii) shows that G(·) overidentifies
F (R) when n ≥ 3, while G(·) overidentifies F (R) for all n ≥ 2. This can be used to
test the null hypothesis that a reserve price restricts participation.
3.1.2 Participation unknown to active buyers
Winning bid density discontinuities arise because buyers observe the number of par-
ticipants NR before submitting their bids. If they do not observe NR, the winning
bid density becomes continuous on its inner support. However, it is shown that iden-
tification still holds if the analyst observes whether the object is left unsold, whether
NR = 1 or if an instrument for the reserve price is available.
5Since G (W = R) = 2F (R) (1− F (R)) only identifies the set {F (R) , 1− F (R)} when n = 2, ,
auctions with a good sold at the reserve price to a unique bidder cannot be used to recover F (R).
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We first recall the quantile expression of the optimal bidding strategy. Because
buyers participate in the auction if and only if Ai ≥ R, the optimal bidding strategy
BR(·) is a strictly increasing function of the normalized uniform signals Ai,R in (14),
which is also the bid quantile function. Suppose now that Buyer 1 participates and
decides to place a bid BR(a) given her signal A1,R = α. Given Buyer 1’s participation,
the number of participants in N \ {1}, NR − 1, has a Binomial distribution with
parameter (n− 1, 1− F (R)) and is independent of participant signals Ai,R. It follows
that the probability that Buyer 1 wins is
P
(
max
i∈N\{1}
Ai,R ≤ a |1 participates
)
=
n−1∑
n=0
an
(n− 1)!
n!(n− 1− n)! [1− F (R)]
n F n−1−n(R)
which is equal to [F (R) + (1− F (R)) a]n−1. Hence the expected payoff of Buyer 1 is
(VR(α)−BR(a)) [F (R) + (1− F (R)) a]n−1 .
Arguing as for the best response differential equation (2) shows that
BR (α) +
(
α +
F (R)
1− F (R)
)
B
(1)
R (α)
n− 1 = VR(α), BR (0) = R, (18)
of which the unique solution is
BR(α) = VR(α)−
∫ α
0
(
F (R) + [1− F (R)]t
F (R) + [1− F (R)]α
)n−1
V
(1)
R (t)dt. (19)
Structure of the outcome distribution. Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.1 below
summarize the model implications for the auction outcome distribution. In these
results, GR(·) stands for B−1R (·) and G(·) for the continuous component G(·|Sold) of
the outcome distribution. Lemma 3.1 extends a result of Guerre et al. (2000) on the
divergence of the bid p.d.f. at the vicinity of the reserve price.
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Proposition 3.2 An outcome distribution G (·) is rationalized by a first-price auction
model satisfying Assumptions IPV, with a reserve price R in (v, v), and buyers who
observe the number of participants if and only if
(i). There is a probability q ∈ (0, 1), and an integer number n ≥ 2 with G (Not sold) =
qn. The c.d.f.
GR(b) =
[(1− qn)G (W ≤ b |Sold) + qn]1/n − q
1− q
has a support [R, bR] for some R < bR <∞.
(ii). BR (·) = G−1R (·) is continuously differentiable with B(1)R (0) = 0. The function
BR (α) +
(
α +
q
1− q
)
B
(1)
R (α)
n− 1
has a continuous derivative which is strictly positive over [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 3.2: See Section 6.4 in the proof section.
Lemma 3.1 The c.d.f. GR(b) and G(b) have p.d.f. gR(b) and g(b), respectively,
which are continuous over (R, bR] and diverge when b goes to R with
0 < lim
b↓R
{
(b−R)1/2gR(b)
}
<∞, 0 < lim
b↓R
{
(b−R)1/2g(b)} <∞.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: See Section 6.5 in the proof section.
Compared to the case where the participants observeNR, the outcome distribution
G(·) puts no mass at the reserve price, G(W = R) = 0. Proposition 3.2-(ii) implies
that the winning bid p.d.f. g(·) and gR(·) are continuous on their inner support.
Lemma 3.1 shows, however, that these winning bid p.d.f. are infinite at the reserve
price. These features can be used to test whether or not the buyers observe the level
of competition.
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Identification results. Proposition 3.2-(i) shows that the winning bid c.d.f. G(·)
has a mixture structure; that is, since q = F (R),
G(b) =
[F (R) + (1− F (R))GR(b)]n − F n(R)
1− F n(R)
=
n∑
n=1
n!
n!(n− n)!
[1− F (R)]n F n−n(R)
1− F n(R) G
n
R(b).
The c.d.f. mixture components are powers of the same c.d.f. GR(·), so that this
winning bid distribution looks simpler than it counterpart (17) of the case where
buyers observe participation. However, due to the absence of support variation across
mixture components, it lacks the p.d.f discontinuities that are crucial to identifying
the distribution of NR when buyers observe participation. This explains the non
identification result of Proposition 3.3-(ii).
Proposition 3.3 Consider a first-price auction satisfying Assumption IPV with a
reserve price R in (v, v) and a number NR of participants unknown to buyers and the
analyst. Then
(i). the reserve price R is identified from the winning bid c.d.f. G(·).
(ii). the private value c.d.f. {F (v) , v ≥ R} and the maximal number n of partici-
pants are not identified from the outcome distribution G (·).
(iii). {F (v) , v ≥ R} and n are identified from G(·) and P(NR ≥ 2) if the analyst
observes the auction outcomes and whether there were at least two participants.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: See Section 6.6 in the proof section.
As seen from the simple mixture structure of the distribution G(·), GR(·) can
be recovered as soon as F (R) and n are identified, which ensure identification of
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the quantile function VR(·) by (18). This is used in Proposition 3.3-(iii) to restore
identification as F (R) and n can be identified from
F n(R) = P(NR = 0) = G(Not sold),
nF n−1(R) [1− F (R)] = P(NR = 1) = 1− P(NR ≥ 2)−G(Not sold).
Alternatively, identification also holds under an exclusion restriction, which con-
siders an instrument z that affects the reserve price but not the other primitives of
the model, as assumed later on for the cost of an entry model.
Assumption R. The reserve price is a non-constant function R(z) of the instru-
ment z ∈ Z. The private value c.d.f. F (·) and n do not depend upon z.
Proposition 3.4 shows that, thanks to variation in the instrument, model primitives
can be identified from the conditional outcome distribution {G(·|z), z ∈ Z}, without
additional observation on NR as in Proposition 3.3-(iii) but with the assumption that
failed auctions where the object remains unsold are observable to the analyst.
Proposition 3.4 Consider a first-price auction satisfying Assumptions IPV and R
with a reserve price R (z) ∈ (v, v) for all z ∈ Z and NR participants, where NR is
unknown to the buyers and the analyst. Then
(i). R (·) is identified from the conditional winning bid distribution G (·|·).
(ii). the private value c.d.f {F (v) , v ≥ infz∈Z R (z)} and the maximal number n of
participants are identified from the conditional outcome distribution G (·|·).
Proof of Proposition 3.4: See Section 6.7 in the proof section.
As Theorem 2.1 shows that the updated private value c.d.f. {FR(z)(·), z ∈ Z} is
identified, it also follows that F (·) is identified from the collection {G(·|z), z ∈ Z} of
conditional winning bid c.d.f. in auctions with at least two bidders if infz∈Z R(z) = v.
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3.2 First-price auction with entry costs
Endogenous variation of the number of buyers can arise from entry costs. This sec-
tion considers the affiliated-signal entry model of Ye (2007) considered in Marmer,
Shneyerov and Xu (2013) and Gentry and Li (2014). Each auction has two stages.
In the first stage, buyer i observes a private signal Si for her unknown private value,
i = 1, . . . , n. Each buyer decides whether to enter the auction. Entry involves pay-
ment of an entry cost c. In the second stage, the Nc buyers who decide to enter
observe their private values Vi, which are independent draws from the conditional
c.d.f. F (·|Si). The active buyers then submit bids Bi in a first-price auction.
Gentry and Li (2014) assume for identification purposes that the entry cost de-
pends upon an observed auction-specific continuous variable, c = c (Z), and that Z
affects neither the signals nor the private values. The signals Si are assumed to be
i.i.d., from a standard uniform distribution without loss of generality. Given Si, the
private value Vi is independent of Nc, Z, and the other private values and signals.
Following Gentry and Li (2014), we will use the following assumption:
Assumption E. The number of potential entrants n is greater than or equal
to 2 and does not depend upon z. The support of F (·|s, z) = F (·|s) is [v, v] for
all s ∈ [0, 1]. F (·|·) is continuous over [v, v] × [0, 1] with a continuous p.d.f. f (·|·)
bounded away from 0 over this set. For any v ∈ [v, v] , F (v|s) decreases with s ∈ [0, 1].
The cost function c (·) is non-constant and continuous over Z, which is a closed
connected set with non-empty interior.
Gentry and Li (2014, Proposition 1) show that any symmetric Nash equilibrium
of the two-stage auction game has a payoff equivalent equilibrium in which Stage 1
entry decisions involve a signal threshold s (z) = σn (c (z)) that we detail now. Let
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Fc (v|s (z)) be the updated private value distribution given that the buyer participates,
Fc (v|s) = P (Vi ≤ v|Si ≥ s) = 1
1− s
∫ 1
s
F (v|t) dt.
The signal threshold is characterized through backward induction. For the mo-
ment, suppose that buyers do not observe the number of entrants Nc. Since the
symmetric second-stage bidding strategy is increasing under Assumption IPV, the
probability that a buyer with private value v wins the auction is
(s+ (1− s)Fc (v|s))n−1 ,
where s = s (z) is a threshold below which buyers do not enter the auction. A buyer’s
post-entry expected profit is∫ v
0
(s+ (1− s)Fc (t|s))n−1 dt;
see Riley and Samuelson (1981, Eq. 8). Thus, the first-stage expected profit of a
buyer with a signal S is
Πn (S; s) =
∫ v
0
[1− F (v|S)] (s+ (1− s)Fc (v|s))n−1 dv. (20)
This expression is also valid when buyers observe the number of entrants.
By Gentry and Li (2014)’s Proposition 1, all buyers enter if c (z) ≤ Πn (0; 0) and
none enter if c (z) ≥ Πn (1; 1). If Πn (0; 0) ≤ c (z) ≤ Πn (1; 1), the threshold s (z)
solves the break-even condition Πn (s; s) = c (z); that is
c (z) =
∫ v
0
[1− F (v|s (z))]× [s (z) + (1− s (z))Fc (v|s (z))]n−1 dv, (21)
a condition which is useful for identifying the cost. Under the conditions imposed
on Z in Assumption E, it follows from Gentry and Li (2014) that s(Z) is a closed
interval of [0, 1], which is not a singleton if 0 < s(z) < 1, as will be assumed for the
remainder of this paper.
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Let us now study the identification of model primitives for each of when buyers
can and cannot observe the number of entrants Nc. The analyst observes the winning
bid but does not observe the number of entrants Nc. The distribution of Nc given
Z = z is binomial (n, 1− s(z)) such that
P(Nc = n|Z = z) = n!
n!(n− n)! [1− s(z)]
nsn−n(z).
Buyer signals are
Ai,c = Fc(Vi|s(Z)), i = 1, . . . , Nc (22)
which are i.i.d. from the [0, 1] uniform distribution and independent of Nc and Z.
The updated second stage private value quantile function is Vc(·|s) = F−1c (·|s).
3.2.1 Entry known to active buyers
Finding the best response bidding strategy when buyers observe Nc = n follows the
same steps as those of the reserve price case with observed participation. When n = 0
the object is not sold and when n = 1, the unique entrant can win the object with a
bid of 0. When n ≥ 2, the optimal bidding strategy is a function of n, Z, and Ai,c
from (22), which is strictly increasing with respect to the latter. The optimal bidding
strategy is equal to the conditional bid quantile function Bn,c(·|z) = B(·|Nc = n, Z =
z). Arguing as for (2) yields
Bn,c (α|z) + αB
(1)
n,c (α|z)
n− 1 = Vc (α|s (z)) , Bn,c (0|z) = v, (23)
Bn,c (α|z) = n− 1
αn−1
∫ α
0
tn−2Vc (t|s (z)) dt = Vc (α|s (z))−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
V (1)c (t|s (z)) dt.
(24)
Structure of the outcome distribution. The next proposition summarizes the
implications of this entry model for the outcome distribution. For the remainder of
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this section, G(·) will be the continuous component of the outcome distribution, such
that
G(b|z) = G (W ≤ b |W > 0, Z = z ) . (25)
Proposition 3.5 A conditional outcome distribution {G (·|z) , z ∈ Z} is rationalized
by a first-price auction model with entry cost satisfying Assumption E, where buyers
observe Nc, with a continuous threshold s(·) such that s(Z) ⊂ (0, 1), if and only if
(i). there is a continuous q (·), where q (Z) ⊂ (0, 1), and an integer number n ≥ 2
such that G (Not sold|z) = q (z)n and G (W = 0|z) = nq (z)n−1 (1− q (z)).
(ii). Let G(·|·) be as in (25). There exists some conditional c.d.f. Gn(·|q(·)) such
that
G (·|z) =
n∑
n=2
pn (z)G
n
n (·|q(z)) , pn (z) =
n!
n!(n−n)!q (z)
n−n (1− q (z))n
1− q (z)n − nq (z)n−1 (1− q (z)) .
(iii). The quantile functions Bn (·|q(z)) = G−1n (·|q(z)) are continuously differentiable
with
Bn(α|q(z)) + αB
(1)
n (α|q(z))
n− 1 = Bm(α|q(z)) +
αB
(1)
m (α|q(z))
m− 1 = Vc(α|q(z))
for all 2 ≤ n,m ≤ n and all α ∈ [0, 1], where Vc(·|·) belongs to the class Vq,v
of V (·|·) satisfying: (1) inf(α,z)∈[0,1]×Z ∂V (α|q(z))∂α > 0, V (0|q(z)) = v over Z;
(2) The function − ∂
∂q
[(1− q)V −1c (v|q)] decreases with q over the closed interval
q(Z) ⊂ (0, 1) and is a conditional c.d.f. with positive density on its support
closure.
Proof of Proposition 3.5: See Section 6.8 in the proof section.
The probability q (z) of Proposition 3.5 is an entry probability, or equivalently, a
threshold signal. Proposition 3.5-(ii) reveals that entry costs constrain the dependence
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between auction outcomes and entry probability: G(·|z) is equal to the conditional
outcome distribution given q(z).6 A similar sufficiency property recently appears
in Liu, Vuong and Xu (2017), who characterize Bayesian Nash equilibrium in entry
games.
Identification results. The identification results in the next corollary follows from
the density discontinuities generated by the compatibility condition of Proposition
3.5-(iii). Corollary 3.2 parallels Corollary 3.1, which holds for reserve price first-price
auction where buyers observe participation. As in the latter result, Corollary 3.2
bases identification on the winning bid c.d.f. G(·|z) of first-price auctions that attract
at least two buyers.
Corollary 3.2 Consider a first-price auction model with entry cost satisfying As-
sumption E with s(Z) ⊂ (0, 1) and Nc number of entrants, where Nc is observable to
buyers but not the analyst. Then
(i). the number of potential buyers n and {Fc (·|s (z)) , z ∈ Z} are identified from
the winning bid c.d.f. G (·|z) in (25).
(ii). if n ≥ 3, {s (z) , z ∈ Z}, {c (z) , z ∈ Z} and {F (·|s), s ∈ s (Z)} are identified
from the winning bid c.d.f. G (·|z)
(iii). if n = 2, c (z) and s (z) are identified for all z ∈ Z and F (·|s) is identified for
all s ∈ s (Z) from the outcome distribution G (·|z).
Proof of Corollary 3.2: See Section 6.9 in the proof section.
Corollary 3.2-(i) follows from Theorem 2.1 and the fact that the second stage of
this auction is a first-price auction with private values drawn in Fc(·|s(z)). Part (ii,iii),
6A similar result holds in presence of a reserve price; see Proposition 3.4 and the discussion at
the end of Section 3.3
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which establishes identification of the primitives F (·|·) and c(·) when s (Z) = [0, 1],
follows from (i) and Gentry and Li (2014, Section 3.2), who have noted that the cost
function can be identified from Fc(·|s(z)) and (21).
3.2.2 Entry unknown to active buyers
If the buyers submit their bids without observing Nc, arguing as for reserve price with
unknown participation shows that the bid quantile Bc (·|z) satisfies
Bc (α|z)+
(
α +
s(z)
1− s(z)
)
B
(1)
c (α|z)
n− 1 = Vc(α|s(Z)), BR (0) = Vc(0|s(z)) = v, (26)
for which the unique solution is
Bc(α|z) = Vc(α|s(z))−
∫ α
0
(
s(z) + [1− s(z)]t
s(z) + [1− s(z)]α
)n−1
V (1)c (t|s(z))dt. (27)
Structure of the outcome distribution. The next proposition and lemma sum-
marize the implications of this entry model for the outcome distribution.
Proposition 3.6 {G (·|z) , z ∈ Z} is rationalized by a first-price auction model with
entry cost satisfying Assumption E, buyers do not observe Nc, and there is a contin-
uous threshold s(·) such that s(Z) ⊂ (0, 1), if and only if
(i). There is a continuous q (·), where q (Z) ⊂ (0, 1), and an integer number n ≥ 2
such that G (Not sold|z) = q (z)n and G (·|z) = G (·|q(z)). The c.d.f.
Gc(b|q(z)) = [(1− q
n(z))G (W ≤ b|Sold, z) + qn(z)]1/n − q(z)
1− q(z)
has a support [v, bc(z)] for some v < bc(·) <∞.
(ii). Bc (·|z) = G−1c (·|z) is continuously differentiable with B(1)c (0|z) = 0. The func-
tion
Vc(α|q(z)) = Bc (α|z) +
(
α +
q(z)
1− q(z)
)
B
(1)
c (α|z)
n− 1
belongs to Vq,v.
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Lemma 3.2 Let the c.d.f. Gc(·|z) and G(b|z) = G (W ≤ b |Sold, Z = z ) be as in
Proposition 3.6. Then GR(·|z) and G(·|b) have p.d.f. gR(·|z) and g(·|z), respectively,
which are continuous over (v, bR(·)] and diverge when b goes to v with
0 < lim
b↓v
{
(b− v)1/2gR(b|z)
}
<∞, 0 < lim
b↓v
{
(b− v)1/2g(b|z)} <∞.
The proofs of these results are omitted as they involve arguments similar to those
of Propositions 3.5, 3.2 and Lemma 3.1.
Identification results. As for reserve price, variation of the instrument is sufficient
for identification of the entry model when entrants do not observe competition.
Proposition 3.7 Consider a first-price auction model with entry cost satisfying As-
sumption E, where the buyers and analyst do not observe the number of entrants Nc.
Suppose in addition that the maximal bid Bc(1|z) varies with z ∈ Z.
Then the maximal number of entrants n, the threshold signal {s (z) , z ∈ Z}, the
c.d.f {F (·|s) , s ∈ s (Z)}, the signal and cost function {c (z) , z ∈ Z} are identified
from the outcome distribution {G (·|z) , z ∈ Z}.
Proof of Proposition 3.7: See Section 6.10 in the proof section.
The variation condition on Bc(1|z) is testable. While the proof of Proposition 3.4
establishes that the maximal bid BR(1|z) under reserve price R(z) is not constant,
showing that Bc(1|z) satisfies such a requirement seems out of reach in full generality.7
Interestingly, the important role played by the upper bound of the bid distribution in
Propositions 3.4 and 3.7 parallels the role of the conditional bid distribution’s upper
bounds for achieving identification when the buyers observe competition.
7This amounts to studying the variations of Bc(1|z) with respect to s(z), as in Li and Zheng
(2009,2012). But these authors consider different entry models, where, in particular, at least two
bidders enter.
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3.3 Information and entry models identification
The preceding sections considered four auction models whether competition is re-
stricted by a reserve price or an entry cost and whether or not active buyers observe
the number of competitors. We now show that the winning bid distribution char-
acterizations obtained above can be used to decide which of these models hold. To
decide whether entry is restricted by a reserve price or an entry cost, it is convenient
to rely on an instrument satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption ER. Buyers are restricted either by a reserve price R(·) as in
Assumptions IPV and R, or an entry cost c(·), as in Assumption E. The instru-
ment z ∈ Z satisfies Assumption R with R(Z) ⊂ (v, v) or Assumption E with
c(Z) ⊂ (Πn(0, 0),Πn(1, 1)) and v > 0, respectively.
The instrument z can stack instruments specific to reserve price and entry cost,
i.e. z = (zR, zc) with R(z) = R(zR) and c(z) = c(zc).8
Our first result deals with buyer information. Corollary 3.3-(i,ii) allows to identify
whether buyers observe or not competition from the continuous component of the
conditional outcome distribution G(·|z), that is using auction data with at least two
active buyers. Corollary 3.3 also holds in the absence of instrument.
Corollary 3.3 Under Assumption ER, active buyers observe the number of partici-
pants if any of the three following conditions hold:
(i). If n > 3 and for each z ∈ Z, the continuous component of G(·|z) has a p.d.f.
g(·|z) which has at least one discontinuity on its inner support.
8Assumption ER restricts to cases where reserve price or entry cost is binding, so that the two
participation models have an empty intersection. Although it is feasible to assume a nonbinding
reserve price or entry cost, we have not done so here for the sake of brevity.
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(ii). For each z ∈ Z, the p.d.f. g(·|z) of the winning bid distribution is bounded at
its support lower bound w(z).
(iii). There is a %(z) ≤ w(z) such that G(W = %(z)|z) > 0 for each z ∈ Z. If so,
entry is restricted by a reserve price %(z).
Proof of Corollary 3.3: (i,ii) follows from Lemma 2.1-(ii) and the compatibility
conditions in Propositions 3.1-(iii) and 3.6-(ii), which give that g(·|z) is continuous
on its support, except possibly, at a finite number of discontinuity points when n > 3,
and when buyers observe competition, while Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 give that g(·|z)
diverges at its lower boundary. (iii) is a consequence of Propositions 3.1-(i), 3.2-(i),
3.5-(i) and 3.6-(i). 
The next corollary investigates whether entry is restricted by a reserve price or
entry cost using instruments variations. In this result, w(z) stands for the lower
support bound of the continuous componentG(·|z) of the outcome distributionG(·|z).
Corollary 3.4 Suppose Assumption ER holds. Then {G(·|z), z ∈ Z} is rationalized
by an entry cost if any of the following conditions hold:
(i). w(·) does not depend upon on the instrument, in which case w(·) = v.
(ii). Either G(W = 0|z) > 0 for all z ∈ Z, or for v > 0 independent of z as in (i),
g(·|z) diverges at v with 0 < limb↓v
{
(b− v)1/2g(b|z)} <∞ for all z ∈ Z.
Proof of Corollary 3.4: This follows from Propositions 3.1-(ii,iii), 3.1-(i), 3.5-(ii,iii),
3.5-(i), and Corollary 3.2, observing that, for a reserve price, w(z) = R(z) > 0 must
depend upon z by Assumption R, that G(W = 0|z) = 0, and either G(W = R(z)|z) >
0 or g(·|z) diverges at R(z) by Corollary 3.1. 
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Corollary 3.4 uses support variation to characterize entry cost models. An alter-
native characterization of reserve price and entry cost models is as follows. Liu et al.
(2017) note that conditional outcome distribution G(·|z) in entry games only depends
upon the entry probability pi(z), i.e. G(·|z) = G(·|pi(z)). As noted after Proposition
3.5, a similar sufficiency property holds under entry cost or reserve price. Using the
identified entry updated private value c.d.f. and the identified probability of entry
give functional forms that can be tested. Under a reserve price model, the updated
private value c.d.f. is, for v ≥ R(z) and pi(z) = F (R(z)),
FR(v|z) = F (v)− pi(z)
1− pi(z) ,
and (1−pi(z))FR(v|z)+pi(z) does not depend upon z. This contrasts with the updated
private value distribution under an entry model, for which pi(z) = s(z) as
Fc(v|pi(z)) = 1
1− pi(z)
∫ 1
pi(z)
F (v|s)ds.
Hence observing (1 − pi(z)Fc(v|pi(z)) + pi(z) depending upon z is evidence against a
reserve price model.
4 Applications to USFS timber auctions
This section illustrates applications of our identification results to USFS timber auc-
tions. These auctions have been studied extensively in the literature. However, no
existing work allows the actual competition differ from the observed number of bids.
We study the first-price auction data used in Lu and Perrigne (2008). The data con-
tain 107 two-bid auctions and 108 three-bid auctions, and report the appraisal value
and timber volume of each auctioned lot. See Lu and Perrigne (2008) for further
information on this dataset. Since the literature argues that the USFS reserve prices
are too low, we also assume that they are nonbinding.
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Our first exercise illustrates detection of pdf discontinuities and estimation of the
distribution of competition N from winning bids. Hence N should be interpreted as
the number of bidders contributing to the winning bid, or the number of competitive,
or equivalently equilibrium bids, which may differ from the distribution of the number
of bids if, for instance, some bids are dominated. A robustness analysis using only
three-bid auctions confirms this finding. Our second exercise studies bidders’ risk
attitude as in Lu and Perrigne (2008). Treating competition as a latent variable, we
provide a robust approach for bounding the CRRA parameter.
4.1 Competition analysis
Let W` be the winning bid in auction ` and X` = (X1`, X2`) be the associated auc-
tioned lot covariate, which includes the appraisal value and volume. Being agnostic
about the competition, we consider only a winning bid sample computed from the two
samples with two and three bids. The number of bidders is considered as unobserved
heterogeneity and the sample size is L = 215. We first estimate the lowest number
of bidders n and then focus on discontinuities in the conditional winning bid pdf and
on the conditional distribution of N .
4.1.1 The lowest number of bidders
The lowest number of bidders n is assumed to be independent of the covariate X,
but the presence of X complicates its identification and estimation. Without auction-
specific covariates X, G(b) = gnn(0)(b− v)n(1 + o(1)) when b decreases to v. We can
estimate n as a lower tail index of the cdf G(·), see Lemma 2.1-(iii). In this case, the
Hill estimator as in Hill and Shneyerov (2013) can be applied. With auction-specific
covariates X, n can be identified as a conditional lower tail index when b decreases
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to the common conditional lower bound v(X)
G(b|X) = gnn(0|X) (b− v(X))n (1 + o(1)).
However, the standard Hill estimator may not be consistent except when v(·) is
Figure 4: Hill estimators n˜: two-bid and three-bid auctions
constant. To address this issue, we first estimate the lower bound v(X) and use it to
normalize the winning bids. Applying to the normalized sample of winning bid, the
Hill estimator is consistent.
Note that auction theory predicts that the lower bound of value v(X) is the lower
bound of the conditional bid distribution. Recall that auction-specific covariates
consists in the appraisal value and volume, say X` = (X1`, X2`). For a growing
integer number K = KL and k = 0, . . . , K, let Xˆ1(k/K) Xˆ2`(k/K) be the sample
quantiles of order k/K of X1` and X2`. Let X`K be the set (Xˆ1((k−1/K), Xˆ1(k/K)]×
(Xˆ2((k − 1/K), Xˆ2(k/K)] to which X` belongs and set9
v̂` = min (min {Bij, i = 1, 2 and Xj in X`K} ,min {Bij, i = 1, 2, 3 and Xj in X`K})
9Note that the lower boundary estimator v̂` depends upon the bids and not the winning bids,
which is permitted because the aim here is to analyze competition and not to recover primitives
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We use these lower bound estimates to normalize the winning bids as
W †` =
W`/v̂`
min1≤`≤L (W`/v̂`)
− 1.
The proposed estimator of the lowest number of bidders n̂ is a rounding of the tail
index Hill n˜ estimator of Hill and Shneyerov (2013) using W †`
1
n˜
= lnW †(M) −
1
M − 1
M∑
m=2
W †(m), M = ML ≥ 2 with ML = o(L). (28)
The lowest number of bidders estimator n̂ is equal to the integer number k whenever
k − .5 < n˜ ≤ k + .5. Figure 4 reports Hill estimation values n˜ when M ranges from
21 to 65 and K = 2 in solid line, with 95% confidence interval bounds in dashed line.
The most common estimate of the lowest number of bidders n̂ is n̂ = 2, with n̂ = 1
for only small M yielding noisy n̂, or large M which gives biased estimates. Hence it
seems very likely that n = 2 for this sample.
4.1.2 Discontinuities and competition distribution
Conditioning variables. The presence of conditioning variables also affects de-
tection discontinuities. In principle, the conditional winning pdf g(·|X) can be esti-
mated using observations with covariate X` close to X. In view of our small sample
size, we adopt a data-driven approach and consider three subsamples labelled "Low",
"Medium" and "High" defined as follows:
• Low: auctions with appraisal value and volume both smaller than their median
values (45 auctions, among which 23 have two bidders);
• Medium: auctions with appraisal value and volume both between their 25%
and 75% quantiles (53 auctions, among which 28 have two bidders);
from winning bids. Using the winning bids to estimate v̂` gives normalized winning bids which are
too concentrated. Alternative Hill estimation procedures for conditional tail index, which does not
use such normalization, can be found in Gardes and Stuffler (2014) and the references therein.
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• High: auctions with covariates above their median values (44 auctions, among
which 20 have two bidders).
Although these subsamples are small, detecting discontinuities and their locations
can be done with super efficient rates, see Oudshoorn (1998) and Gayraud (2002).
Detection of discontinuities. We propose in the appendix a multiple testing
approach, inspired by Chu and Cheng (1996) and Oudshoorn (1998), for detecting
discontinuities, locate them and compute a corresponding discontinuous conditional
pdf estimator. To cope with an irregular distribution of the winning bids across
the straight line, we adopt a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) approach in place of Chu
and Cheng (1996) kernel approach. The idea is to conclude a point of discontinuity
when the difference between the densities on the two sides of this point is larger
than a threshold. Naturally, this threshold depends on the magnitude of the density
function in the neighborhood.
Implementing the discontinuity detection algorithm gives a unique discontinuity
inside the subsample support for each subsample, so that n̂ = 3 in all cases. Figure 5
reports the discontinuous conditional density estimators obtained for each subsample.
In each case, the estimated discontinuity ∆̂2, in the middle of the subsamples, is quite
large compared to the end discontinuity ∆̂3. Table 1 gives, for each subsample, the
estimation of the probability that N = 2 derived from the discontinuities in the
winning bid pdf using the conditional version of (12) (line "From W") and using the
number of bids observed in the sample (line "Observed"). The value inferred from
the estimated winning bid distribution is much higher than the one obtained from the
bid distribution, consistently across subsample. This suggests that, for most auctions
with three reported bids, only two bidders contribute to the winning bid while the
remaining one makes a dominated bid.
45
Figure 5: Conditional density estimation for ’Low’, ’Medium’ and ’High’ subsamples
4.1.3 Analysis using the subsample of three-bid auctions
We provide further evidences on the lack of competition by repeating the above esti-
mation procedure on the sample of three-bid auctions. First, we estimate the lowest
number of bidders. Figure 6 displays the results of the Hill estimation procedure for
this sample. Despite the maximum bids W` are now computed using only three-bid
auctions, Figure 6 supports an estimate n̂ = 2 for the lowest number of bidders. This
is a first evidence suggesting that one bidder may not contribute to the winning bid
in this dataset. Second, we estimate the probabilities of N = 2 from pdf disconti-
nuities obtained as in the previous section for each subsample ’Low’, ’Medium’ and
’High’. Table 2 reports the estimates. The results are qualitatively similar to the
ones in Table 1, except for the ’Medium’ sample for which the estimated probability
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Low Medium High
From W .95 .90 .92
Observed .51 .53 .45
Table 1: Estimated P(N = 2|A) using both two-bid and three-bid auctions
Figure 6: Hill estimators n˜: three-bid auctions
of having two bidders contributing to the winning bid is lower but still higher than
0.5. However, the variance of these estimations are likely to be very high due to their
nonparametric nature and small sample sizes. Therefore, the estimation n̂ = 2 for
the lowest number of bidders derived from Figure 6 may be a stronger evidence. This
finding can be explained by the presence of a passive or dominated bidder in many
auctions. More advanced explanations are however outside the scope of this paper.
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Low Medium High
From W .98 .75 .91
Table 2: Estimated P(N = 2|A) using three-bid auctions
4.2 Bounds for risk aversion
Bidders’ risk aversion behaviors in auctions have attracted much attention in the lit-
erature. A commonly adopted specification is the Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) U(x) = xθ. While Campo et al. (2011) showed that θ is not identified when
participation is endogenous, Guerre et al. (2009) obtained risk-aversion identification
when the exogenous participation is observed.10 Using USFS timber auction data with
both first-price and ascending auctions, Lu and Perrigne (2008) obtained estimates
of θ in the range of 0.4. Using semiparametric restrictions for the bid distribution,
Campo et al. (2011) obtained estimates of θ between 0.65 and 0.8 from a sample
of USFS first-price auctions. All these works assume that all bids are equilibrium
outcomes, whose failure leads to biased estimates of risk aversion parameters. Allow-
ing for auction unobserved heterogeneity may however lead to conclude in favor of
risk-neutral bidders, as in Grundl and Zhu (2019) who also consider USFS first-price
auctions.
Hereafter, we assume the competition level N is exogenous and unobservable to
the analyst. Following the same lines as in our benchmark case, we derive lower
bounds for the CRRA parameter θ using the winning bid distribution. Suppose that
10Relaxing exogeneity is possible with entry models as seen from Gentry, Li and Lu (2017). These
authors assume that all bids are equilibrium outcomes, which, as argued below, is an assumption
that can be questioned for the considered samples. Indeed, under CRRA, the above estimation n̂ = 2
in the sample with three bids auctions remains valid, suggesting that one bid is not competitive in
many auctions.
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N = n and observe that the expected utility generated by a bid Bn(a) for a private
value V (α) is
(V (α)−Bn(a))θ an−1 =
[
(V (α)−Bn(a)) an−1θ
]θ
when the bidder’s utility function is CRRA. The latter expression shows that, for
equilibrium bids, α must maximize a 7→ (V (α)−Bn(a)) an−1θ . Therefore, introducing
risk-aversion here amounts to change n− 1, i.e., the number of opponents of the risk-
neutral case, into (n − 1)/θ. Arguing as for (3), it follows that the equilibrium bid
quantile function now becomes
Bn(α) =
(n− 1)/θ
α
n−1
θ
∫ α
0
t
n−1
θ
−1V (t)dt = V (α)−
∫ α
0
(
t
α
)n−1
θ
V (1)(t)dt.
The last expression of Bn(·) shows that the maximum bid Bn(1) increases with n. As
(2) becomes V (α) = Bn(α) + θαB
(1)
n (α)/(n− 1), the conditional bid pdf gn(·) is con-
tinuous and bounded away from 0. Arguing as for Corollary 2.1 yields that gn(v) > 0,
implying that our Hill estimator is still consistent under risk-aversion. Hence the es-
timate n̂ = 2 obtained in the last subsection still applies under risk-aversion. In other
words, one shall not treat all bids as equilibrium outcomes. Similarly, discontinuities
of the winning bid identifies the largest number n of bidders, which amounts to 3
under risk-neutrality.
We now show how to derive bounds for the CRRA parameter θ, despite being
agnostic about N . Accounting for risk-aversion in formula (7) of Corollary 2.1 and in
the jump formula (9) yields that
gn
(
bn
)
=
θ
(n− 1) (v − bn) and ∆n = nθpn(n− 1)(v − bn) .
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Updating the formulas (11) and (12) for v and pn gives
v(θ) =
θ +
∑n
n=n
n−1
n
∆nbn∑n=n
n
n−1
n
∆n
,
pn(θ) =
n−1
n
∆n∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆k
+
1
θ
n− 1
n
∆n
(∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆kbk∑n
k=n
k−1
k
∆k
− bn
)
, n = n, . . . , n.
Using that v(θ) ≤ bn and 0 ≤ pn(θ) ≤ 1 for n = n, . . . , n gives bounds for θ that
can be estimated. For the estimated values of n, n, bn and ∆n, only the constraint
p2(θ) ≤ 1 is informative. This gives, for each considered subsamples, estimated lower
bounds for θ which are reported in the next table.
Low Medium High
Two and three bids .78 .48 .44
Three bids .90 .25 .65
Table 3: Lower bound for the CRRA parameter θ inferred from p̂2(θ|A) ≤ 1
Assuming that the risk aversion parameter is constant across subsamples, we
obtain the best lower bound for the CRRA coefficient θ 0.9, which is quite high
relative to the estimates reported in the literature, such as Lu and Perrigne (2008)
and Campo et al. (2011). This suggests that accounting for the possibility that some
bids are not necessarily equilibrium outcomes may affect risk-aversion estimation.11
Risk-neutrality becomes more plausible when assuming that N is not observed, ie
11Note also that the CRRA lower bounds of Table 3 could be, in theory, improved. Indeed, an
estimated upper bound p̂2(A) can be obtained by dividing the number of winning bids below the
estimated discontinuity b̂2, as reported in Figure 5 by the considered subsample size and by using
the inequality p̂2(θ|A) ≤ p̂2(A) instead of p̂2(θ|A) ≤ 1 to obtain a lower bound for θ. This would
lead to replace the lower bound 0.25 by 0.47, but, when providing a meaningful bound, would give a
risk-aversion larger than 1 in many other cases. Such finding is not so surprising in view of the small
sample sizes. Guerre and Gimenes (2019) also report that risk-aversion can be difficult to estimate.
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that competition is a source of unobserved heterogeneity. This parallels Grundl and
Zhu (2019), who however consider auction unobserved heterogeneity associated with
the auctioned good.
5 Final remarks
This paper shows that, under the independent symmetric private value paradigm, the
first-price auction winning bid is sufficient to identify model primitives when buyers
observe competition. The case where buyers do not observe competition is more
difficult, but still feasible with an instrument when participation is restricted by a
reserve price or entry cost. Whether entry is constrained by a reserve price imposed
by the seller, or by an entry cost can be tested.
An empirical application on USFS timber first-price auction winning bids has il-
lustrated the usefulness of our theoretical results for competition analysis. A disconti-
nuity detection procedure has found discontinuities in the winning bid pdf, suggesting
that bidders observe competition according to our theoretical findings. Investigating
further the distribution of the number of competitive bidders reveals that most auc-
tions with three bids include a dominated bidder, who does not contribute to the
winning bid. Relaxing risk-neutrality by assuming a Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function leads to a similar conclusion. Deriving bounds for the
CRRA parameter from the winning bid illustrates the impact of ignoring dominated
bidding on risk-aversion estimation: risk-neutrality looks much more plausible using
our approach which tackles with this issue than found in previous studies.
Our theoretical findings could be the source of many further developments. Dis-
criminating the various possible explanations for dominated bidding, such as a poor
understanding of the auction rules or collusion among others, would be very inter-
esting. Econometric methods for modeling the participation decision based upon the
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winning bid can also be useful for data that can be analyzed through the auction
machinery. The statistical methods used in this paper for competition analysis can
probably be refined. Estimating the private value distribution from winning bids
necessitates to extend estimation methods for irregular models as proposed in Hi-
rano and Porter (2003) or Chernozhukov and Hong (2004) to allow for many density
discontinuities.
Further, our theoretical results shed light on new identification arguments for dis-
crete mixture models, which are widely used in economic applications, in particular
when unobserved heterogeneity is plausible. In our model, the mixture components
are generated by the same function. The components are ordered according first-order
stochastic dominance and their supports are nested. These two features may appear
in other relevant economic mixtures. See for instance An (2017) who studied non
equilibrium bids from heterogeneous agents whose beliefs follow from level k think-
ing, and where k is unobserved. A key ingredient is that these support components
can be identified, here through discontinuities of the mixture pdf but many other
characteristics can be used for such a purpose.
6 Proof section
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Consider (i) first. Since αk = Gn [Bn−1 (αk−1)] with Bn−1 (α) ≤ Bn (α),
αk = Gn [Bn−1 (αk−1)] ≤ Gn [Bn (αk−1)] = αk−1,
which implies that αk decreases. Moreover, βk = Bn−1 (αk) decreases because Bn−1 (·)
is strictly increasing. Since αk ≥ 0, αk converges to a limit α which satisfies α =
Gn [Bn−1 (α)] under Assumption IPV. In other words, the limit α satisfies Bn (α) =
Bn−1 (α). This gives α = 0 as Bn (α) > Bn−1 (α) except for α = 0.
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Now, consider (ii). That αk is identified for all k will follow from an induction
argument, observing α1 is identified. Suppose then that αk and {V (α) , α ∈ [αk, 1]}
are identified. Recall
αk+1 = Gn (βk) = Gn [Bn−1 (αk)] , βk+1 = Bn−1 (αk+1) .
Then (4) and Lemma 2.2 give that {Bn (α) ;α ∈ [αk, 1]}, for all n = n, . . . , n− 1 are
identified, as βk. Now (13) and Lemma 2.2 show that Gn (b) is identified for all b ≥ βk,
and then αk+1 = Gn (βk) is identified. (2) then gives that {V (α) ;α ∈ [αk+1, 1]} is
identified. This ends the proof of the Lemma. 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose that the transaction price is generated from a first-price auction with a
reserve price R and NR known by the n buyers and such that Assumption IPV
holds. Then q in (i) satisfies q = F (R), R is the unique real number such that
G(W = R) > 0, and NR has a Binomial distribution with parameter (n, F (R)). This
gives
G (Not sold) = P (NR = 0) = qn,
G (Object sold at price R) = P (NR = 1) = nqn−1(1− q).
Now, for Gn(·) = B−1n,R(·), it holds for W = maxi∈N Bi that
G(b) = G (W ≤ b |NR ≥ 2)
=
n∑
n=2
G
(
max
i=1,...,n
Bi ≤ b |NR = n
)
P (NR = n |NR ≥ 2)
=
n∑
n=2
Gnn(b)
n!
n!(n− n)!
F n−n(R) [1− F (R)]n
1− F n(R)− nF n−1(R) [1− F (R)] ,
which is (ii). Gn(·) = B−1n,R(·) and (15) gives (iii).
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For the reverse implication, observe that (i)-(iii) identify a number of potential
buyers n, a screening level F (R), a reserve price R which is uniquely defined when
0 < F (R) < 1, and a private value quantile function V (α), where α ≥ F (R), which
can be extended to [0, 1] so that Assumption IPV holds. It can be easily seen from
(16) that the distribution of the outcome distribution of this first-price auctions is
G (·).
6.3 Proof of Corollary 3.1
(i) follows from Theorem 2.1, which gives identification of VR(·) and n. For (ii),
observe that the expression of G(·) in Proposition 3.1-(ii) holds with q = F (R). Since
G(·) is the winning bid distribution of a first-price auction with i.i.d. private values
drawn from FR(·) and independent from the number of participants NR, Lemma 2.2
shows that
pn(R) =
(1− F (R))n
1− F (R)n − nF (R)n (1− F (R)) ,
pn−1(R) =
n (1− F (R))n−1 F (R)
1− F (R)n − nF (R)n (1− F (R)) ,
are identified if n ≥ 3. Thus the ratio npn(R)/pn−1(R) is identified, and thereby
F (R), since
F (R) =
1
1 + npn(R)/pn−1(R)
.
This together with the expression of FR (·) shows that F (v) is identified for v ≥ R.
For (iii), G (Not sold) = F 2 (R) identifies F (R) and then F (v) is also identified for
v ≥ R by (i). When n = 2, F (R) cannot be recovered from G(·). Since v < R, it
can be easily seen that a given FR(·) can be generated by two distinct {F (v), v ≥ R},
which generates the same G(·). Hence {F (v), v ≥ R} cannot be identified when
n = 2. 
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose that G (·) has been generated by a first-price auction satisfying Assumption
IPV, with a reserve price R but with the number of participants NR not observed by
buyers. The probability that NR = 0 is F (R)
n ∈ (0, 1) if v < R < v, which is also
equal to G (Not sold). Since the Bi ≥ R are given by BR (Ai,R), W has a continuous
distribution with support
[
R, bR
]
, bR = BR (1). Since all Ai,R and NR are independent
and because NR has a binomial distribution with parameter (n, 1− F (R)), the c.d.f.
G(b) = G(W ≤ b |Sold) of W is given by
G (b) =
∑n
n=1 P (maxi=1,...,NR BR (Ai,R) ≤ b|NR = n)P (NR = n)
1− P (NR = 0)
=
n∑
n=1
n!
n!(n−n)! (1− F (R))n F (R)n−n
1− F (R)n G
n
R (b)
=
(F (R) + (1− F (R))GR (b))n − F (R)n
1− F (R)n ,
where GR (·) = B−1R (·) has support
[
R, bn
]
. Setting q = F (R) gives (i) and (ii) follows
from (18) and (19).
For the converse, observe that the reserve price is identified as BR(0), set F (R) = q
gives
VR(α) = BR(α) +
(
α +
q
1− q
)
B
(1)
R (α)
n− 1 ,
FR(·) = V −1R (·) and F (v) = (1 − F (R))FR(v) + FR(v) for v ≥ R. Choose v < R
and note that F (·) can be extended to [v,R] to obtain a continuously differentiable
c.d.f. with bounded support [v, v]. It can be easily seen that these primitives generate
first-price auction best response bids compatible with the outcome distribution G(·).
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6.5 Proof of Lemma 3.1
It holds that
gR(b) =
1
B
(1)
R [GR(b)]
for all b in (R, bR)
which diverges when b goes to R as B(1)R (0) = 0 and GR(R) = 0. Let VR(·) be the
continuously differentiable quantile function of Proposition 3.2:
VR(α) = BR(α) +
(
α +
q
1− q
)
B
(1)
R (α)
n− 1 .
Hence, for α > 0,
B
(2)
R (α) = (n− 1)
V (1)R (α)−B(1)R (α)
α + q
1−q
− VR(α)−BR(α)(
α + q
1−q
)2

= (n− 1)1− q
q
V
(1)
R (0) + o(1) when α→ 0.
It follows that, when α goes to 0 and b to R
B
(1)
R (α) = (n− 1)
(1− q)2
q
V (1) (R)α + o (α) ,
BR (α) = R +
n− 1
2
(1− q)2
q
V (1) (R)α2 + o
(
α2
)
,
GR (b) =
(
2
n− 1
q
(1− q)2 V (1) (R)
)1/2
(b−R)1/2 + o
(
(b−R)1/2
)
,
gR (b) =
(
1
2 (n− 1)
q
(1− q)2 V (1) (R)
)1/2
(b−R)−1/2 + o
(
(b−R)−1/2
)
,
which shows 0 < limb↓R (b−R)1/2 gR (b) <∞. Now, for b in (R, bR],
G(b) =
[q + (1− q)GR(b)]n − qn
1− qn ,
g(b) =
n(1− q) [q + (1− q)GR(b)]n gR(b)
1− qn ,
which gives the divergence result for g(·). 
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 3.3
For (i), note that the lower bound of the support of G (·) is R. For (ii), consider n = 2,
reserve price R = 1/2 and private values uniform over [0, 1]. The next computation
shows that the outcome distribution can also be rationalized with n = 4, R = 1/2,
and a private value distribution distinct from uniform.
We first compute the distribution G (·) generated by n = 2, R = 1/2, private
values uniform over [0, 1] and a reserve price R = 1/2, so that F (R) = 1/2 and
F n (R) = 1/4. The private value quantile function is V (τ) = τ , VR(α) = (1 + α) /2
and the best-response bid quantile function is
BR,2 (α) =
1 + α
4
+
1
4 (1 + α)
=
(1 + α)2 + 1
4 (1 + α)
, α ∈ [0, 1] .
The corresponding continuous component G(b) = G(W ≤ b|Sold) of G(·) is
G (b) =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
B−1R,2 (b)
)2 − 1
4
1− 1
4
,
setting B−12,R (b) = 0 for b ≤ 1/2 and B−12 (b) = 1 for b ≥ 5/8. The outcome distribution
is
G (not sold) =
1
4
, G (W ≤ b| sold) = G (b) .
If G (·) can be rationalized by first-price auctions with reserve price 1/2, n = 4 and
F (R)n = 1/4, which gives F (1/2) = 1/
√
2, there must exist a bid quantile function
B4,R (·) satisfying B4,R (0) = 1/2, such that
G (b) =
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
B−14,R (b)
)4
− 1
4
1− 1
4
and a private value quantile function as in Proposition 3.2-(ii). Solving
(
1
2
+ 1
2
B−12,R (b)
)2 − 1
4
1− 1
4
=
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
B−14,R (b)
)4
− 1
4
1− 1
4
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shows that it must hold that
B4,R (α) = B2,R
[
2
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)2
− 1
]
=
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)2
2
+
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)−2
8
,
which is such that B4,R (0) = R = 1/2. This also gives
B
(1)
4,R (α) =
(
1− 1√
2
)
×

(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)
−
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)−3
4
 ,
which satisfies B(1)4,R (0) = 0. To check that B4,R (·) is compatible with a private value
quantile function, it remains to be checked that
v (α) = B4,R (α) +
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
1− 1√
2
B
(1)
4,R (α)
3
=
5
6
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)2
+
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)−2
24
increases with α. Note that
dv (α)
dα
= 2
(
1− 1√
2
)
×
56
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)
−
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)−3
24

=
2
(
1− 1√
2
)
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)−3
{
5
6
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)4
− 1
24
}
with, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
5
6
(
1√
2
+
(
1− 1√
2
)
α
)4
− 1
24
≥ 5
6
× 1
4
− 1
24
=
1
6
.
It follows that v(1) (·) > 0. Recall v(0) = 1/2. Consider a c.d.f. F (·) over [0, 1] such
that, for α ∈ [1/√2, 1],
F−1 (α) = v
(
α− 1√
2
1− 1√
2
)
, so that F
(
1
2
)
=
1√
2
.
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A proper definition of F (·) on [0, 1/2] ensures that F (·) satisfies Assumption IPV. By
Proposition 3.2, G(·) is rationalized by a first price auction with a reserve price 1/2
and: 1) uniform private values with n = 2; 2) non-uniform private values with c.d.f.
F (·), n = 4, and F (R) = 1/√2. This establishes the non-identifiability statement in
(ii).
For (iii), note that 0 < F (R) < 1. It is sufficient to show that
P (NR = 0) = F (R)n and P (NR = 1) = nF (R)n−1 (1− F (R))
identify n and F (R), as G (·) will in turn identify GR (·) and F (v) for all v ≥ R.
Since
n =
logP (NR = 0)
logF (R)
and
P (NR = 1)
P (NR = 0)
= n
1− F (R)
F (R)
,
it follows that F (R) ∈ (0, 1) solves
1− F (R)
F (R) logF (R)
=
P (NR = 1)
P (NR = 0) logP (NR = 0)
;
in other words, ϕ (F (R)) is identified, where ϕ (x) = (1− x) / (x log x). Since,
∂ϕ (x)
∂x
= − 1
x log x
− (1− x) (1 + log x)
(x log x)2
= − log x− (x− 1)
(x log x)2
≥ 0,
where the inequality is strict for all x in [0, 1]12 except for x = 1, ϕ (·) is a one-to-one
mapping over, (0, 1) and F (R) is identified so that n = log P(NR=0)
logF (R)
is identified. 
6.7 Proof of Proposition 3.4
As R (z) is the lower bound of G (·|z), R (·) is identified. Since
G (not sold|z) = F (R (z)) ,n
12Using ∂∂x [log x− (x− 1)] = 1x − 1 ≥ 0 gives log x− (1− x) ≤ log 1 = 0 over [0, 1].
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F (R (·))n is identified. The upper bound bR (·) = BR(1|z) of G (·|·) is identified and,
for all b and all z ∈ Z,
(F (R (z)) + (1− F (R (z)))GR (b|z))n
is also identified. Since, when t > 0 goes to 0,(
F (R (z)) + (1− F (R (z)))GR
(
bR (z)− t|z
))n
=
[
1 + (1− F (R (z))){GR (bR (z)− t|z)− 1}]n
= 1− n (1− F (R (z))) gR
(
bR (z) |z
)
t+ o (t) ,
the function γ (z) = nR (1− F (R (z))) gR
(
bR (z) |z
)
is identified over Z. Since
gR
(
bR (z) |z
)
= 1/B
(1)
R (1|z), taking α = 1 in (18) gives
gR
(
bR (z) |z
)
=
1
(n− 1) (1− F (R (z))) (v − bR (z)) ,
and thus
γ (z) =
n
n− 1
1
v − bR (z)
.
Since, by (19),
bR (z) = v −
∫ 1
0
[F (R(z)) + (1− F (R(z)))t]n−1 V (1)R (t) dt
= v −
∫ 1
0
[F (R(z)) + (1− F (R(z)))t]n−1
×V [F (R(z)) + (1− F (R(z)))t] (1− F (R(z)))dt
= v −
∫ 1
F (R(Z))
un−1V (1)(u)du,
with V (1) (·) > 0, R (z1) 6= R (z2) implies that bn (z1) 6= bn (z2) and then γ (z1) 6=
γ (z2). This identifies v and n as
v =
γ (z2) bR (z2)− γ (z1) bR (z1)
γ (z2)− γ (z1) ,
n =
γ (z)
(
v − bR (z)
)
γ (z)
(
v − bR (z)
)− 1 .
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Since F n(R(·)) is identified, F (R (·)) is identified. Hence {GR(b|z), b ≥ R(z), z ∈ Z}
is identified, since {BR (α) , α ≥ F (R (z)) , z ∈ Z} is identified. (18) implies that
F (v) is identified for any v such that there is a z satisfying v ≥ R (z). Then
{F (v) , v ≥ infz∈Z R (z)} is identified by continuity of F (·). 
6.8 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Suppose that an entry model with entry cost satisfying Assumption E generates
G (·|z). That (i)-(iii) hold can be established as in Proposition 3.1. Suppose now that
(i)-(iii) hold. Let n and s (z) = q(z) be as in (i). For s in q(Z), let Vc (α|s) be as in
(iii). Set Fc (·|s) = V −1c (·|s) and
F (v|s) = − ∂
∂s
[(1− s)Fc (v|s)]
which is a conditional c.d.f. over [v, v]×q (Z), that can be extended over [v, v]× [0, 1].
Defining c (·) through (21) gives a cost function which rationalizes G (·|·). 
6.9 Proof of Corollary 3.2
(i) follows from Theorem 2.1, observing that n is identified by the number of discon-
tinuities of the p.d.f. g (·|z). The proof of (ii) starts as the proof of Corollary 3.1-(ii),
using the probabilities
pn (z) =
(1− s (z))n
1− s (z)n − ns (z)n (1− s (z)) ,
pn−1 (z) =
n (1− s (z))n−1 sn (z)
1− s (z)n − ns (z)n (1− s (z)) ,
which are identified from G (·|·) if n ≥ 3 to identify s (z). Then F (·|s) can be
identified over the identified interval s (Z) using F (v|s) = − ∂
∂s
[(1− s)Fc (v|s)] and
the identification of c (·) over Z follows from (21). The proof of (iii) is similar to the
proof of Corollary 3.1-(iii), identifying s (z) from G (not sold) = s (z)2. 
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6.10 Proof of Proposition 3.7
The proof proceeds as for Proposition 3.4. Repeating the arguments of Section 6.7
gives that sn(z) and
γ(z) =
n
n− 1
1
v − bc(z)
are identified over Z. As in the proof of Proposition 3.4, this holds provided that
bc(z) = Bc(1|s(z)) is a non-constant function to identify s(·) and n as assumed in
Proposition 3.7. 
Appendix: discontinuity detection algorithm
Consider a subsample A = Low, Medium, or High. Hereafter, we omit A for con-
venience. Let W`, ` = 1, . . . , L be winning bids. First, we estimate a tentative
discontinuity at each data point as the difference between the density estimates on
its left and right sides. Consider a first "small" bandwidth h0, set to 0.2 in the appli-
cations. The tentative discontinuity at W(`) is estimated using the difference of left
and right k-NN density estimators
δ̂h0(W(`)) =
`−max (`− h0L/2, 1)
L
(
W(`) −W(`−h0L/2)
) − min (`+ h0L/2, L)− `
L
(
W(`+h0L/2) −W(`)
) ,
where ` − h0L/2 is truncated to 1 if negative and ` + h0L/2 to L if larger than
L. Second, we estimate the magnitude of the density at each point and calculate a
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threshold. Define also the k-NN pdf estimator and the critical value13
ĝh0(W(`)) =
min (`+ h0L/2, L)−max (`− h0L/2, 1)
L
(
W(`+h0L/2) −W(`−h0L/2)
) ,
C(`)(;h0) = ĝh0(W(`))c(;h0) with
c(;h0) =
√
ln(1/h0) +
ln ln(1/h0)− ln(pi) + 2
2
√
ln(1/h0)
and where  = L goes to 0 with L, and is set to 0.01 here.
We now use the tentative discontinuity estimates and thresholds to estimate lo-
cations of jump points and jump sizes. If
δ̂h0(W(`?1)) = max1≤`≤L
δ̂h0(W(`))
is smaller than the critical value C(`?1)(;h0) then the conditional winning bid pdf g(·)
has no discontinuities. Otherwise a discontinuity is found at W(`?1), with an estimated
jump δ̂h0(W(`?1)). The next jump will be searched using the same procedure but
excluding the indexes ` between `?1 − h0L/2 and `?1 + h0L/2. The procedure is then
iterated until iteration q̂, such that the potential jump is smaller than C(`?
q̂
)(;h0).
The number of jumps is then q̂ − 1, so that the estimation of the largest number n
of bidders is n̂ = n̂ + q̂. Ordering the jumps locations W(`?q) gives an estimation of
the conditional bid support boundary b̂n̂+q and of the discontinuity jumps ∆̂n̂+q. A
conditional winning bid density estimator incorporating discontinuities is then, for
`?q < ` ≤ `?q+1 with `?0 = 1,
ĝdh1(W(`)) =
min
(
`+ h1L/2, `
?
q+1
)−max (`− h1L/2, `?q + 1)
L
(
W(min(`+h1L/2,`?q+1))
−W((max(`−h1L/2,`?q+1))
) ,
where the bandwidth h1 > h0 is set to 0.5 in our application. Other values of ĝdh1(·)
are then obtained by linear interpolation.
13Note that the critical value C(`)(;h0) is proportional to the estimated pdf, as standard for k-NN
estimation. This contrasts with the square root estimated pdf used in Chu and Cheng (1996) for
their kernel approach.
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